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(U) 82nd Major League Baseball All-Star Game

Joint Special Event Threat Assessment

17 June 2011



Federal Bureau
of Investigation



Phoenix Police
Department



Arizona Counter
Terrorism
Information
Center



Homeland
Security



Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office

(U) Joint Special Event Threat Assessment: 82nd Major League Baseball All-Star Game

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(U) Prepared by the Phoenix Division of the FBI; the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Terrorist Targets and Tactics Branch; the FBI Critical Incident Response Group/Critical Incident Intelligence Unit; the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center; the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office; and the Phoenix Police Department. Contributing information provided by the Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group reviewed this product from the perspective of our nonfederal partners.

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Special Event Threat Assessment (JSETA) addresses potential threats from international and domestic terrorists, cyber actors, criminals, and foreign intelligence services to the 82nd Major League Baseball (MLB)^{USPER} All-Star Game (ASG), which will be played on 12 July 2011 at Chase Field in Phoenix, Arizona. This JSETA also addresses potential threats to various MLB-sanctioned events scheduled for the Phoenix metropolitan area during the five days prior to the game. This information is intended to support federal, state, tribal, and local government agencies and authorities, and other entities in developing and prioritizing protective and support measures relating to an existing or emerging threat to homeland security.

(U//FOUO) Information in this assessment is current as of 16 June 2011. Federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local law enforcement agencies will provide any subsequent threat information via their respective formats, as warranted.

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) The information contained in this assessment is derived from national-level intelligence and law enforcement sources; state, local, and tribal law enforcement; and open source reporting. Where no source reporting exists, judgments are based on the most likely potential threats or on past threats to similar targets. The reliability of federal and local law enforcement information sources is generally assessed as high (the information is credibly sourced and corroborated). Open source reporting is assessed as medium (the information is credibly sourced and plausible, but may contain political or journalistic bias, and may be intended to influence as well as inform).

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(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) The FBI, DHS, and Phoenix metropolitan-area law enforcement agencies have identified no credible terrorist threats to the MLB ASG or its associated events and venues. Nevertheless, we assess that the MLB ASG's high profile could make it a desirable target for terrorists or individuals seeking to cause casualties and to exploit media coverage to promote their cause.

- (U//FOUO) The visible security presence at the stadium most likely will deter potential attackers. Prospective attackers, however, may view nearby local infrastructure—such as hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs—as more feasible targets.
- (U//FOUO) We assess that the placement of explosive devices in heavily trafficked areas would be the most likely mode of terrorist attack. Security breaches facilitated by stolen or counterfeit credentials or by individuals with legitimate access to the facility pose additional threats to stadium security.

(U//FOUO) Criminal elements normally operate at high-profile sporting events, but we assess that anticipated criminal activity is unlikely to cause significant disruptions or threaten event security.

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating any credible cyber or foreign intelligence threats to the MLB ASG.

(U) Event Overview

(U) On 12 July 2011, the MLB ASG will be played at Chase Field in Phoenix.* Chase Field has a capacity of 48,633 people for games. The MLB ASG will be televised nationwide and broadcast internationally on the radio and the Internet. Events associated with the MLB ASG will begin five days prior to the game with the opening of "FanFest" at the Phoenix Convention Center. There will be many professional athletes and celebrities at these associated events. Refer to Appendix G for a full list of events associated with the MLB ASG.

(U) International Terrorism Threat

(U//FOUO) We have no credible information that al-Qa'ida or other international terrorist groups are planning to attack the MLB ASG, Chase Field, or other infrastructure and venues associated with the game.

(U//FOUO) Although the media attention afforded to the MLB ASG makes it a potentially attractive target for terrorist groups or homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), the highly visible security measures for the game, including numerous security personnel and barriers, most likely will deter attacks.† At the same time, this security could make nearby, less-secure targets attractive alternatives for terrorists determined to conduct high-profile attacks.

* (U) See Appendices A through F for area maps and locator images of event venues and Appendix G for a full list of official events and locations.

† (U//FOUO) For the purposes of this JSETA, an HVE is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is prepared to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.

- (U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups historically have attacked lightly defended or symbolic targets around the world, such as hotels, housing compounds, nightclubs, places of worship, restaurants, and schools. Open-access facilities near major events, such as team or fan hotels, generally lack the extensive security measures in place at primary special event facilities, offering terrorists better opportunities to cause mass casualties, economic damage, and panic, as well as to attract media attention.

(U) Domestic Terrorism Threat

(U//FOUO) We have no information that domestic terrorists plan to conduct attacks against or coinciding with the MLB ASG.

(U//FOUO) No groups or individuals in the Phoenix metropolitan area are known to have the intent or capability to target Chase Field or associated events and venues.

(U) Lone Offender Threat

(U//FOUO) We have no information that lone offenders plan to conduct attacks against the MLB ASG. Lone offenders pose a potential threat to any large event and are often difficult to detect because they have no visible links to known terrorist groups or networks, and they conduct their typically limited planning and preoperational activities in isolation.*

(U) Criminal Threat Trends and Environment

(U//FOUO) We have no information that any specific individuals or groups plan to conduct criminal actions targeting the MLB ASG or associated events and venues. Criminal elements normally operate at such prominent events, but they are unlikely to cause significant disruptions or threaten event security.

- (U//FOUO) Based on previously observed trends at other high-profile special events, we assess that prostitution activity and narcotics sales are likely to increase during the MLB ASG.¹

(U) Impact of Usama Bin Ladin's Death

(U//FOUO) As of the date of this JSETA, we have no information that the MLB ASG will be targeted in response to bin Ladin's death on 2 May 2011. We assess, however, that bin Ladin's death, in the near-term, is likely to motivate HVEs in particular to conduct retaliatory attacks against the Homeland. HVEs generally are unburdened by organizational constraints that can slow operational decisions by established terrorist groups seeking revenge and notoriety.

(U) Source:
(U//FOUO) DHS and FBI; Joint Intelligence Bulletin;
*(U//FOUO) Homeland Implications of Usama Bin Ladin's Death"; 2 May 2011; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(U//FOUO) No Indications of SB 1070-Related Violence

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating any plans to conduct violent or criminal action to protest Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), which instituted anti-illegal immigration measures in Arizona that generated controversy nationwide when the bill was signed into law in April 2010.

* (U//FOUO) For the purposes of this assessment, FBI and DHS define a lone offender as a violent extremist who commits terrorist acts alone and without direction from a group or another individual. The perpetrator may have contact with others, but those other individuals are not aware of the perpetrator's plans or intentions.

(U) Foreign Intelligence Threat Environment

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating a specific foreign intelligence threat related to the MLB ASG.

(U) Cyber Threat Environment

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating a potential cyber threat to the MLB ASG or related venues and events.

(U) Transportation Threat Environment

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating specific plans by violent international or domestic terrorist groups to attack public transportation in the Phoenix metropolitan area in connection with the MLB ASG.

(U) The city of Phoenix is well served by several freeways and interstate highways. The public transportation system, known as Valley Metro, consists of a light rail system—an intercity passenger rail service extending 20 miles with 32 stations linking downtown Phoenix and Chase Field to the cities of Tempe and Mesa—and intra- and inter-city buses.² Spectators largely will travel to the stadium in private vehicles, rental cars, chartered buses, taxis, limousines, and on shuttle buses from nearby parking lots.

(U//FOUO) We currently have no credible intelligence suggesting that international or domestic extremists are plotting an attack against the Valley Metro transit system during the MLB ASG. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, however, have demonstrated a continuing intent and capability to attack mass transit in the Homeland and remain the primary terrorist threat to the US transportation sector.³

(U) Intelligence Gaps

(U//FOUO) Will international terrorists or HVEs be motivated by bin Ladin's death to commit a terrorist act at or near the MLB ASG or associated events?

(U//FOUO) Are international terrorist organizations planning to attack the MLB ASG?

(U//FOUO) What tactics and attack methods would terrorists use?

(U//FOUO) Are domestic terrorist groups planning to attack or disrupt the MLB ASG?

(U//FOUO) Are any lone offenders planning to attack or disrupt the MLB ASG?

(U//FOUO) Are individuals or groups attempting to gain unauthorized access to secured areas of MLB ASG venues as part of a planned terrorist attack?

(U//FOUO) Are there any reports of stolen law enforcement badges or credentials from security personnel or other law enforcement agencies that could be used to gain access to secured areas of MLB ASG venues?

(U//FOUO) Are there groups or individuals targeting fans or celebrities who may be at the MLB ASG?

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(U//FOUO) Has any group or individual conducted surveillance or preoperational activities in support of a terrorist attack against this event or nearby infrastructure?

(U//FOUO) Which criminal enterprises, if any, plan to target MLB ASG and related event attendees?

(U//FOUO) Which foreign intelligence collectors, if any, may be present during the MLB ASG?

(U//FOUO) Which groups or individuals, if any, may be interested in launching a cyber attack to disrupt the MLB ASG?

(U) Reporting Notice

(U) FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI's 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC@ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or by email at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm> and Fusion Center information may be obtained at <http://www.dhs.gov/contact-fusion-centers>. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by email at NICC@dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response

(U//FOUO) Information contained in this JSETA is for official use only. No portion of this assessment should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.

(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Critical Incident Response Group/Critical Incident Intelligence Unit at (202) 324-3000, or I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov.

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
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¹ (U) DHS Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Intelligence Assessment; 15 October 2010; "(U) Homeland Security Investigations Threat Assessment for Super Bowl; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

² (U) Valley Metro; <http://www.valleymetro.org>; accessed 8 June 2011; UNCLASSIFIED; UNCLASSIFIED.

³ (U) TSA-OI; TSA-OI Mass Transit Threat Assessment; 2 March 2011; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(U) Appendix A: Major League Baseball All-Star Game Phoenix Overview



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(U) Appendix D: Biltmore Hotel



(U) Appendix F: Phoenix Convention Center



**(U) Appendix G: Major League Baseball All-Star Game
Events and Locations**

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8-12 July: **MLB All-Star FanFest** at
Phoenix Convention Center

Friday, 8 July: 0900 – 2000 MST

Saturday, 9 July: 0900 – 2000 MST

Sunday, 10 July: 0900 – 2000 MST

Monday, 11 July: 0900 – 2000 MST

Tuesday, 12 July: 0900 – 1800 MST

10 July: Taco Bell **All-Star Sunday** at
Chase Field

XM All-Star Futures Game

Taco Bell All-Star Legends

Celebrity Softball Game

11 July: Gatorade **All-Star Workout
Day** at Chase Field

State Farm Home Run Derby

12 July: 82nd MLB **All-Star Game** at
Chase Field

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